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The Citizen Moves
from the Audience to the Arena
KAARLE NORDENSTRENGThese reflections on current thinking about freedom
of speech in Finland1 suggest that despite the well-
known tendency towards concentration, tabloidiza-
tion, etc., the media field is surrounded by a ten-
dency in support of a citizen-centred notion of free-
dom of speech and freedom of the press.
What is the essential in freedom of speech in the
light of current trends? This study suggests a para-
digm shift which boils down to five aspects:
1) The dominant frame of reference in freedom of
speech is no longer the question of censorship –
the advance surveillance of heroic media by a vil-
lainous state – but of human rights. Each indi-
vidual has an inalienable right to information and
its dissemination, and also to an opinion and its
expression, namely the right to communicate.
2) The masters of freedom of speech are not the
mass media and the journalists, i.e. media – an
avantgard party fighting valiantly for their free-
dom – it is the citizens for whom freedom of
speech ensures both democracy and quality of
life.
3) Because it is the media which organize the use of
citizens’ freedom of speech, it is they who are re-
sponsible to the citizens for their actions, both in-
dividually and collectively. In order that this rela-
tion of responsibility be fulfilled there must be
both general social norms and particular self-
regulation by the media.
4) Democracy requires both openness in the wield-
ing of power and citizens’ effective participation
in the social debate and in decision-making
which concerns them. Freedom of speech serves
these ends by maintaining pluralism in communi-1
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Tamperecation in relation to the views and interest groups
in society.
5) Freedom of speech in a democracy requires a
public arena at local, regional and national as
well as international (EU) level. This state of
public affairs is not guaranteed merely by a judi-
cial system which ensures freedom of discussion
among citizenry; there must also be material fa-
cilities for the realization of public information
and debate.
To put it even more briefly: the contemporary think-
ing on freedom of speech emphasizes on the one
hand the right of citizens to communicate (points 1
and 2), and on the other pluralism in public affairs
(points 4 and 5) as well as the responsibility of the
media which serves these ends.
Point 1: From Censorship to Human Rights
The right to communicate is no contentious issue, al-
though it was never written into the new article on
freedom of speech in the Finnish Constitution2. For
some time now censorship in the sense of prior re-
straint has not been a real problem, and this state of
affairs has indubitably been ensured by the very ban
on advance obstacles. Now at last it may be stated
that the legislation on freedom of speech currently in
the making is relegating censorship to history, at
least in its hitherto familiar guise as advance surveil-
lance on the part of the state as a relic of the reli-
gious and secular ruler. In normal conditions censor-
ship merits mention only figuratively – or demago-
gically. Simultaneously the focus of thinking shifts
from a conception of negative freedom (freedom
from something) to the realm of positive freedom
(freedom for something).
Thus it is possible to leave the obvious obstacles
to freedom of speech behind the protective wall of
the Constitution and concentrate on those problems
of freedom of speech which are the most difficult to
perceive and the most awkward to manage. These
“structural” limitations on freedom of speech are
primarily the treatment of mass media content of a
political nature known as self-censorship and the
adapting of content to suit the needs of media sales
and advertising known as commercialism. In both of
these the distinction must be made between real and
imaginary freedom of speech; the latter depending
on the goal which those disseminating information
have set themselves. Moreover, it must be born in
mind that the personnel responsible for the content
of mass communication is seldom homogenous, but
is divided, at least in larger and commercial units,
roughly into two: the fraternity of the editors-in-
chief desirous of pleasing the publisher and the fra-
ternity of journalists, i.e. salaried professionals.
Point 2: From Media to Citizens
The fact that the right to communicate is for all citi-
zens rather than the media and its professionals is a
constitutional truism, but it is still encumbered as far
as communication policy is concerned. The myth
constructed by the media is that they, the media, en-
joy particular protection under the Constitution, and
it lives on among those who have not familiarized
themselves with the fundamentals in legal regulation
of the media. This myth, however, is doomed, not
only because of increasing knowledge but also be-
cause the significance of the civil society is on the
increase – if not in reality then at least in rhetoric –
and the media cannot ignore this because of their
own commercial interests.
As regards the concept of citizen, note should be
taken that the new legislation in the Constitution re-
garding freedom of speech no longer recognizes this
term, but protects everyone or each individual – not
only those who are Finnish citizens in the legal
sense. This is indeed a welcome extension in prin-
ciple, although in practice we may still use the term
citizen in referring to an individual as is customarily
done in social sciences.
The idea of civil society, emphasizing as it does
the role of the individual and the citizen, has gained
prominence, but it is both an historically uncon-
tested and conceptually problematic phenomenon (as
shown in this book by Tuija Pulkkinen in her analy-
sis of J.V. Snellman’s legacy). Nor may it be taken
for granted that in a country like Finland civil soci-
ety is really gaining in strength, at least if it is to be
conceived of separately from market forces; there is
even talk at the present time of the decline of the
civil society. On the other hand it would appear that2the civil society is gaining in strength in relation to
the state, whose position is generally weakening.
Point 3: Responsibility
The notion of the reponsibility of the media to the
citizens and of their responsibility for the legislation
is generally accepted to a very great extent, not least
in the journalists’ profession.3 Journalists see them-
selves as using freedom of speech as the representa-
tives of the citizens, and the professional ideal of the
journalist typically embodies both the watchdog and
the one who enlightens the people (as documented in
this book by Ari Heinonen). On the other hand jour-
nalists, not to mention media owners, are anxious to
remain independent, at least regarding the state. The
relation of responsibility between media and citizens
is not lacking in tensions.
Upon closer examination the media present a
constitutional dilemma. On the one hand we have
freedom of speech and a ban on advance censorship
written into the Constitution. On the other hand the
media, like any institution in society, including free
economic life, are to a certain extent accountable to
a democratic society. The responsibility of commu-
nication has been specified in international agree-
ments on human rights which both guarantee free-
dom of opinion and expression and set limitations on
the disemination of racist and warmongering propa-
ganda, for example. In general, human rights agree-
ments set clear boundary conditions for the media,
just as there are boundary conditions on other as-
pects of life. It is thus impossible for the media to
use freedom of speech to justify their setting them-
selves above social norms and institutions. They
have, on the contrary, a special responsibility, for in
a democratic society both constitutional protection
for freedom of speech and human rights agreements
place the media in the position of a tool in the serv-
ice of citizens.
There are in principle four parties involved in the
regulation of the media: the state (including legisla-
tion), market forces (including advertising), the citi-
zens, and the media themselves. The power of the
state and economic life are always involved one way
or another in the regulation process, but their role is
largely confined to the setting of boundary condi-
tions in order to safeguard the legislative and eco-
nomic status quo. Regulation on the part of civil so-
ciety is in practice possible only in small vehicles of
communication owned by members of associations
and in information networks formed by restricted in-
terest groups. Citizens can bring influence to bear on
the mainstream media only marginally, by their own
consumer behaviour and by participating in the ac-
tivities of pressure groups. Thus in the case of the
press, radio and television self regulation, which is
to say spontaneous acceptance of responsibility for
an autonomous position, remains very much in their
own hands.
Self-regulation of the media is indeed a widely
subscribed to means of regulating the responsibility
of the media in relation to the citizens. In practice
this boils down to professional codes of ethics and
press councils. A newcomer to the modes of self-
regulation is media criticism – a scientifically and
professionally based analysis which facilitates the
debate between media producers and consumers and
the influence-hungry political and economic interest
groups on various aspects of media coverage. In self-
regulation, however, there lurks the danger of re-
maining in the wings and full of good intentions in-
stead of undertaking practical action. Self-regulation
is in principle also doubtful in that the media and
journalism, safe in their autonomy, easily cling to
one another, when professionalism rather inhibits
than promotes the fulfilling of the citizens’ commu-
nication needs4. It thus becomes necessary both to
intensify the effects of self-regulation on profes-
sional practice and to monitor critically the state of
self-regulation.
Point 4: Pluralism
The issue of the place of the public sphere and pub-
lic debate in a democracy entails the traditional no-
tion that in a democracy an individual should be in-
formed in order to participate in decision-making
which concerns him and in what is known as taking
care of matters of general concern. The citizens’ in-
formation needs can be met more efficiently through
the new net services, even if in practice they are
bound to information and power structures which
have long existed (as Timo Kuronen shows in this
book). Since time immemorial it is the satisfying of
the citizens’ needs for information which has been in
the centre of the arena, and markedly so in that
people have been offered factual reporting from the
outside world at the local, national and international
level. In keeping with this tenet of western journal-
ism the citizens’ world view is formed essentially of
intellectual data offered by the media on the basis of
which the citizen takes his bearings in society.
This is then a case of traditional enlightenment
thinking. Its human-centred philosophy and the em-
phasis placed on knowledge and truthfulness is not
of itself outdated – not even in this age of entertain-
ment and other so-called media culture – on the con-
trary, in many ways it is quite “modern” or even
“postmodern”. However, it is to be noted that en-3lightenment thinking in general and journalistic ten-
ets in particular embody a goodly share of paternal-
ism – an example of which is seen in informational
broadcasting policy (as shown by Yrjä Ahmavaara in
this book).
Alongside information and the openness which
supports it, the exchange of opinions or discussion
has risen to assume a more important position than
before. Open discussion also plays an important part
in the forming of knowledge, such that enlighten-
ment and discussion are mutually supportive. This
aspect of freedom of speech gains in prominence
when democracy is understood, no longer as in the
Lockean tradition government of consent but as an
interactive process of government by biscussion, also
known as “deliberative democracy”5.
Both a rich citizens’ discussion and a versatile
supply of journalistic information require that the
content of communication should not be monolithic
nor dependent in its relations to political and eco-
nomic power. This pluralistic principle is one of the
cornerstones of the modern concept of freedom of
speech.
Point 5: Facilities
This follows directly from what went before. The
principle of pluralism is not sufficient for freedom
of speech; there is a need for the public arena which
implements it in practice – there is a need for not
only a communication philosophy but also a commu-
nication policy. Thus various material prerequisites
go hand in hand with the concept of freedom of
speech, which justifies financial support from the
state for both the press and films and also various
communication arenas of the public sector from pub-
lic libraries to video workshops. In the 1970s and
1980s press subsidies from the government rose to
almost 500 million Finnmarks, only to fall in 1996 to
100 million. Such a withdrawal of support from the
communication arena implies a grave narrowing of
freedom of speech. Cuts in government subsidies
may be resisted by recourse to the Constitution.
In this respect it was logical to envisage an addi-
tion to the new wording on freedom of speech in the
Constitution to the effect that “the state shall have
the obligation of promoting to the greatest possible
extent freedom of speech, free formation of opinion
and the right of each individual to varied informa-
tion”. However, the addition was omitted, as a gen-
eral obligation was included for the state to guaran-
tee the realisation of basic rights for all – including
freedom of speech. Another envisaged addition re-
garding freedom of speech to the effect that “any
mass media having a dominant position at the na-
tional or regional level shall have the special obliga-
tion to promote the many-sided formation of opin-
ion” was again omitted because there was no una-
nimity as to the legislating of such concrete issues at
the constitutional level – and because it met with the
particular resistance of the newspaper publishers.
Public service broadcasting provides one typical
example implemented in the practice of a communi-
cation arena whose mission it is to serve all citizens
equally regardless of their domicile, wealth, etc. In
reality this goal cannot be achieved since public
service broadcasting typically follows the main pow-
ers of the country, the government and the majority
of the parliament, even though the institution which
does so is administratively independent and not part
of the power of the state. Nevertheless public service
is by virtue of definition there to ensure a broad-
based freedom of speech in society. And more: free-
dom of speech actually requires, at least in the Euro-
pean interpretation, that a strong public service
broadcasting institution should function in the field
of electronic communication, although it should not
be allowed to assume the position of a monopoly.
Commercial media operating through market
forces, on the other hand, do not serve as an example
of a public arena in which freedom of speech is real-
ised, except in a very limited sense. Markets which
are economically free just simply are not the free
market place of ideas by the classics of liberalism
(John Milton, John Stuart Mill et al.)6. This conflict
between the market and freedom of speech is well
seen in the EU Commission’s Green Paper “Plural-
ism and media concentration in the internal market”
and the related resolutions of the European Parlia-
ment, such as the following:7
The European Parliament,
(....)
B) having regard to the importance that the
question of media concentration has now as-
sumed in the political debate in all Member
States, particularly in relation to safeguard-
ing the democracy and independence of the
media,
C)  having regard to the negative consequences
of having an information society which is
subject solely to market forces, and the need
to take account of the cultural, ethical, social
and political implications,
(....)
5. Regards a balanced apportionment of re-
sources of all kinds as essential in order to
safeguard the pluralism and diversity of the
information media;
(....)
8. Recalls that the public authorities have a duty
to guarantee, in an effective manner, the ex-4ercise of freedom of expression and respect
for pluralism;
9. Calls on the Commission to propose together
with the parties concerned an action pro-
gramme to promote pluralism in the media
with a view to drawing up a code of conduct
for the media in Europe (including the coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe) with the
aim of preserving professional ethics and
guaranteeing the independence of informa-
tion and of journalists.
Media in Democracy
The analysis of freedom of speech in mass commu-
nication is clarified by positioning the media in rela-
tion to power holders on the one hand and to the
citizenry on the other hand. This is done below by
means of two figures.
The first figure presents the media in a classic
representative democracy8. The media are positioned
in relation to public (People) and to political power
(Government). In the theory of democracy the media
provide the people with a channel for both the dis-
semination of information and for discussion. In a
way the media serve the people in the same way as
an elected government, which, in theory at least, acts
to take care of the affairs of the country in the best
interests of the people. Thus the essential relation of
influence is from the people to the media and from
the people to the government – in line with the doc-
trine of the sovereignty of the people. According to
the same theory of democracy the relationship of in-
fluence between the government and the media
works likewise in two directions: firstly the govern-
ment elected by the people has the mandate to be re-
sponsible for communication among other things
(under the Constitution) and then the media are con-
stantly expected to put across to the government the
thoughts and sentiments of the people.
This setup then represents the theory of demo-
cracy.9 Alongside it there is another relationship of
influence which in Finland, too, reflects the actual
situation in a modern representative democracy. In
the real relationship of influence the media assume a
key position. They push in the direction of the peo-
ple and of the government, not the other way round:
however, between the people and the government
there pertains a two-way relationship of influence. It
is true that the media derive content to a great extent
from the people and the government, but in shaping
that content the media wield considerable power.
The ideal and real relationships of influence are thus
virtually opposites, when in point of fact the people
have become the target of influence where according
Figure 1.
Media Government
People
Ideal
Realto the theory they should have been the source of in-
fluence.
Admittedly the figure generalizes and simplifies
the situation, ignoring as it does, for example, the
complex nature of the media, including the alterna-
tive press. Nevertheless the message of the figure
cannot be denied. Democracy does not function as it
ought to according to the theory, and the media and
its practitioners are at the heart of the problem of de-
mocracy. In order to improve the situation – to
achieve democratization – the media must come5
Figure 2.
State
Med
Civ
Socicloser to the people and the actual relationship of in-
fluence between these two must work in two direc-
tions.
The second figure has been taken from Johan
Galtung, in whose three-sided model the pillars of
society are the State, Capital (market forces), and
the Civil Society10. In this setup the media are not
found at the apex of the triangle but rather float
somewhere between the pillars. In the history of Fin-
land the media have found their place close to the
state when the country was under Swedish or Rus-Capital
ia
il
ety
sian domination – only to drift towards the civil soci-
ety in the period of autonomy – whereas in more re-
cent decades the tendency of the media has been to
move towards the markets.
Galtung does not predict that market forces will
completely absorb globalizing society; he also sees a
burgeoning strength in the civil society with its new
movements. Thus the media take a challenging place
in a field of conflicts. In point of fact the media are a
vital channel not only for the civil society in relation
to the state and capital, but also in communication
between the state and capital – in order to ensure
universal publicity and dialogue in society. If the
media succeed in attaining a strong and independent
position in this triangle, they could, according to
Galtung, assume the status of a fourth pillar in the
social power structure.
Media as the Fourth Estate
It is typical to exaggerate the power of the media to
exert influence by ignoring the fact that communica-
tion is not generally an independent power, but
rather an extension of more fundamental social
forces. However, there has been in recent years – in
conditions of the information society – a tendency to
speak with reason of the “medialization” of societal
activity and of the significant power position of the
media in society. The media have become kingmak-
ers in the field of politics at the same time as the
party institution has lost ground. In days gone by the
newspapers were typically an extension of politics,
and newspapermen (indeed mostly men!) were poli-
ticians. Today politics and the media have split up
into two institutions, and the media would frequently
appear to be the stronger.
Traditionally the influence of the media has been
emphasized by talk of the “fourth estate” or “fourth
branch of government” alongside the legislative
(parliament), executive and judicial branches. This
view has gained new impetus from the perspective of
the “media society”. Indeed, Kauko Sipponen has
stated that the classic doctrine of the three branches
is no longer valid when “there are stronger and
stronger power groups operating in society – social
forces whose activity and influence are so significant
that they merit even constitutional examination.
What I have in mind are mass communication, trade
unions and market forces”.11
Thus we are left not with three estates but with
six, including the media. It is natural that the media
have become a subject of political debate and a prob-
lem. On the other hand it is abnormal that so impor-
tant a power factor remains without wider discussion
on principles in the light, for example, of constitu-6tional law. Yet talk on the media has mostly been
trivial politics or utopian worship of technology. The
communication system in our country is overdevel-
oped while our communication policy is underdevel-
oped.
In Sweden, Norway and Denmark the position
and mission of the media have received much more
extensive consideration both as regards social wield-
ing of power and reports of committees on media
policy. The current “functions” of the media have
been condensed among these neighbouring countries
as follows12 on the premiss that the fundamental
value of democracy is the free formation of opinion:
1) information – the media are to provide citizens
with such information that they are able to form
their opinions on issues in society freely and in-
dependently
2) critique – the media as an independent body are
to monitor and scrutinize those wielding power in
society
3) forum – the media are to provide the representa-
tives of different views with the opportunity for
publicity
These functions lead on to such quality requirements
as the informativity of media and journalism, rel-
evance to decision-making in society, truthfulness
and independence. All are familiar concepts from the
days of the debate on objectivity; now there is need
for a new debate on the mission of the media in a de-
mocracy. It is just that the new debate has more nu-
ances than before, for the conception of communica-
tion and its truthfulness and of the role of the media
in society has in the course of its development led to
new problems and paradoxes rather than to “ultimate
truths”.
The basic setup, however, is clear and the core
question remains, what is the relation of the power
of the media to the power of the people. Going from
the basis for freedom of speech the task of the media
and of journalism in particular is to serve the people
and not those who wield power, be that power politi-
cal or economic. Thus in Galtung’s figures the media
should take up a position closer to the civil society.
It is not healthy for the cause of democracy that the
media should move from the political camp to the
economic camp and remain the tool of the elite of
society while the people continue on their own path
as consumers and spectators.
From this position in the United States a start has
been made to seek for new forms of journalism, not
only through investigative reporting, but also civic
journalism or public journalism reaching out the
grassroots.13 The premiss here is that the people are
not only lacking information but also democracy,
and that journalism should pose the questions in the
manner of the man or woman in the street, not as the
political and economic elite would do it. The fault
thus lies not with people but with elitist information
alien to life. This populistic trend has achieved the
support of some publishers, who are concerned about
the decrease in the amount of papers read, especially
among the young.
Civic journalism seeks to support local demo-
cracy not so much by inundating citizens with infor-
mation filtered by the elite but by bringing citizens
to discuss and act on issues which concern them. In
such a case the media and the journalists are trans-
formed from apparently objective reporters to mod-
erators supporting citizen participation. The objec-
tive is to activate citizens who have become cynical
and to revive the community adrift from its ties – to
return from individualism to communitarianism.147It is, however, doubtful to what extent journalism
and the media can be of assistance in the structural
repair of the foundations of society. Projects of a
popular journalistic nature more likely reflect the
rhetoric of the society of citizens than reality, and
this particularly in the United States. One may fur-
thermore ask whether or not the national and
supranational media scene is with “deregulation” be-
coming more anti or pro freedom of speech. On the
other hand the encounter of the global and the local
opens up a new positive perspective – “glocal” – for
both the society of citizens and the media.15
The long-term thinking on freedom of speech is
undeniable: the image of self-sufficient media and a
public receiving information dealt out from above is
being replaced by a new image of media realising
democracy and human rights and of a society of citi-
zens which discusses issues. The citizen is on the
way from the sidelines into the arena.Notes
1. From the concluding chapter in Sananvapaus (“Free-
dom of Speech”, in Finnish), a collection of articles rela-
ting to the author’s project for the Academy of Finland.
The book, edited by Nordenstreng, was published in
Finland in June 1996 (by WSOY). Translation by Vir-
ginia Mattila, University of Tampere, Language Centre.
2. Section X of the Constitution Act of Finland, as
amended in 1995, reads as follows:
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of
speech. The right to freedom of speech shall
include the right to impart, publish and re-
ceive information, opinions and other com-
munications without prior hindrance from
anyone. More precise provisions on the exer-
cise of the right to freedom of speech shall be
prescribed by Act of Parliament. Restrictions
on pictorial programmes necessary for the
protection of children may be prescribed by
Act of Parliament.
The documents and other records in the
possession of public authorities shall be pub-
lic unless their publicity has been separately
restricted by Act of Parliament for compelling
reasons. Everyone shall have the right to ob-
tain information from public documents.
When reform of the Constitution was dealt with in
Parliament Professor Emeritus Osmo A. Wiio, whose
expert opinion was sought, did indeed advocate the
words “right to communicate” in place of “freedom ofspeech”. This proposal, however, was not approved
and remained an academic footnote. For the history of
the concept of the “right to communicate” see
Hamelink 1995, 293-300.
3. Laitila (1995) shows that the European codes of jour-
nalistic ethics clearly attach more importance to re-
sponsibility to the public and to sources than to respon-
sibility which journalists give the state, the employer
and their own profession.
4. This tendency of overemphasizing professionalism
and avoiding the people has been described as “for-
tress journalism”; see Nordenstreng 1995; 1997.
5. See for example John B. Thompson (1995, 249-258)
who gives “deliberative democracy” a prominent place
in the reform of democratic politics and publicity.
6. Walter Lippmann, one of the leading liberal journalists,
commented when examining President Kennedy’s un-
successful TV reform: “There are some things in life
on which you cannot put a price tag – all that is good
and beautiful that we want to hear must first be set free
from the straitjacket of the profit and loss of business
life – just as the universities, the schools, the institu-
tions for scientific research, the museums and parks
have been freed from commercialism.” (Helsingin
Sanomat 14 May 1967)
7. Resolution on pluralism and media concentration
adopted by the European Parliament on 15 June 1995.
In October 1997 the European Parliament returned to
the theme in its resolution on the impact of new tech-
nologies upon the press in Europe based on the so-
called Daskalaki report,including the following provi-
sions:
having regard to the European Parliament’s repeat-
edly-stated position that information is not a product
comparable to other products,
having regard to the undisputed role whish the
press has played – and continues to play – in pro-
moting democracy, freedom and human rights,
having regard to the positive impact of the new
technologies on public information, notably more
rapid and extensive access to a greater number of
sources of information, interaction between the reci-
pient and source of information, the globalization of
information, the more immediate and more demo-
cratic access of citizens to proposals and decisions
taken by European, national and regional authorities
and the easier participation of citizens in the deci-
sion-taking process,
having regard, however, to the concerns ex-
pressed by the European Parliament in the past re-
garding the new communications environment, and
notably: the deluge of information and news which
is not always sufficiently evaluated or processed and
whose source is not always established; the danger
of the marginalization – even temporarily – of cer-
tain social groups which are not yet sufficiently fa-
miliar with the new technologies or do not have
equal access oppotunities to them; the dominanceof
the networks by products that are predominantly
commercial in character at the expence of products
which express Europe’s multilingual and multidi-
mensional cultural identity and heritage; and finally,
a tendency toward human isolation...
8. Taken from the author’s publication which examines
the paradoxical position of the journalist; Norden-
streng 1995, 119. A similar figure has been presented
by Pertti Suhonen when he investigated the role of the
media in publicizing environmental problems and in
the shaping of public opinion; Suhonen 1994, 51. Ac-
cording to this social agenda setting is defined in a tri-
angle at whose apex are the political and economic
power mechanisms, the media and the public.
9. On theory of democracy in general see e.g. Held 1996.
On the relation between the media and democracy see
Keane 1991.
10. Galtung presented his model as a paper read at the
MacBride Round Table in Honolulu, January 1994,
and at a postgraduate seminar at the University of
Tampere in June 1994. The paper will be published in
Vincent et al. 1998.
11. Sipponen 1995, 30.
12. Here the source used is the report by Professor Kent
Asp of the University of Gothenburg to the latest
Swedish Press Committee; see Asp 1994.
13. For more on “public journalism” or “civic journalism”
as presented by those who developed the concept, see
Merritt 1995 and Rosen 1994.
14. See Christians & al. 1993.
15. See Tehranian 1998.8References
Asp, Kent (1994). Massmedia och folkstyrelsen [Mass Me-
dia and People’s Governance]. Arbetsrapport från
expertgruppen Nr 5. Pressutredningen. Institutionen
för journalistik och masskommunikation, Göteborgs
universitet.
Christians, Clifford G., Ferre, John P. & Fackler, P. Mark
(1993). Good News: Social Ethics and the Press. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Galtung, Johan (1998). State, Capital, and the Civil Society:
The Problem of Communication. In Vincent, Richard
C., Nordenstreng, Kaarle & Traber, Michael (eds.). To-
wards Equity in Global Communication: MacBride
Update. Cresskill, N.J.: Hampton Press.
Hamelink, Cees J. (1995). The Politics of World Communica-
tion: A Human Rights Perspective. London/Thousand
Oaks/New Delhi: Sage Publications.
Held, David (1996). Models of Democracy (2nd edition).
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
Keane, John (1991). The Media and Democracy. Cam-
bridge: Polity Press.
Laitila, Tiina (1995). Codes of Ethics in Europe. In
Nordenstreng, Kaarle (ed.). Reports on Media Ethics in
Europe. University of Tampere, Department of Jour-
nalism and Mass Communication. Reports B 41, 23-
56. Abridged in European Journal of Communication
10 (4) 527-544.
Merritt, Davis (1995). Public Journalism and Public Life.
Hilldale: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Nordenstreng, Kaarle (1995). The Journalist: A Walking
Paradox. In Lee, Philip (ed.) The Democratization of
Communication. Cardiff: University of Wales Press,
114-129.
Nordenstreng, Kaarle (1997). Professional Ethics: Between
Fortress Journalism and Cosmopolitan Democracy. In
Brants K., Hermes, Joke & Van Zoonen, Lisbet (eds.)
The Media in Question: Popular Cultures and Public
Interests. London: Sage, 124-134.
Rosen, Jay (1994). Making Things More Public: On the Po-
litical Responsibility of the Media Intellectual. Critical
Studies in Mass Communication 11 (4), 362-388.
Sipponen, Kauko (1995). Mitä jäljellä Ståhlbergin
hallitusmuodosta? [What is left from the Constitution
Act by Ståhlberg]. Politiikka 37 (1), 28-31.
Suhonen, Pertti (1994). Mediat, me ja ympäristä [The media,
we and the environment]. Helsinki: Hanki ja jää.
Tehranian, Majid (1998). New World Order? At the End of
History or Clash of Civilizations? In Vincent, Richard
C., Nordenstreng, Kaarle & Traber, Michael (eds.) To-
wards Equity in Global Communication: MacBride
Update. Cresskill, N.J.: Hampton Press.
Thompson, John B. (1995). The Media and Modernity: A
Social Theory of the Media. Cambridge: Polity Press.
